Theoretical work on the pricing of information reveals that competition between independent information sellers can result in prices that are negatively related to the quality or reliability of the information. The theory argues that when information products are unreliable (low quality), independent products become complements and competition can increase prices. The goal of this study is to empirically test the theory's counterintuitive predictions with the help of an experimental market based on a business simulation. Information products are independent market forecasts, which are available from different competing information sellers and used by information buyers to make marketing decisions. Sellers set prices to maximize their profit and buyers decide from which seller or sellers to buy to maximize their own profit (via their marketing decisions). Buyers and sellers are assigned to one of two quality conditions: highquality or reliable information and low-quality or unreliable information. The reliability of information products (forecasts) is exogenously set and must be inferred by both buyers and sellers from historical forecasts about another market. The results from this experimental market fully support the theory. After some experimentation, prices converge to levels that are strikingly different between the two quality conditions: Prices are significantly higher when the information sold is unreliable (low quality). Moreover, with few competing sellers of low quality information, prices are higher than with a single seller or with a large number of competing sellers.
Many firms are in the business of selling information to customers who then use the purchased information for decision-making. Market research firms, business analysts, various consulting service providers and even some medical doctors specialized in providing diagnosis only, are members of the rapidly growing information industry. While information markets have always been around in some form -for example, Reuters was founded in 1850 with a few dozen carrier pigeons -ever faster technological innovation has contributed to their explosive growth in recent years. The management consulting industry, for instance, has shown an average growth rate of 15% during the past 30 years. Market research and the financial information sectors have had similar, double digit average growth rates in the past decades.
Given this growth, it is not surprising that information marketing has become an emerging topic in the marketing literature. In the last few years, at least half a dozen theoretical papers have been written on information pricing and three of these have recently won the prestigious John D.C. Little Best Paper Award.
1 Most of these papers assume a monopolist information seller and find that the price of information is directly related to its value, which in turn is directly related to its reliability or accuracy. In other words -as is usual in most product markets -the price of information is positively correlated to its quality. Sarvary and Parker (1997) show that moderate competition can reverse the positive price-quality relationship for information goods. 2 In other words, with a small number of competing information sellers equilibrium prices can be higher for unreliable information than for reliable information. This result is driven by the possibility of combining multiple information products from different sellers to create an even better estimate of the "truth" as long as the different information products are not too redundant. When information is reliable, buyers can rely on a single information product leading to a choice between competing sellers. In this case, information products are substitutes. This, in turn leads to harsh price competition between sellers resulting in low prices. In contrast, when buyers perceive information products to be unreliable but sufficiently independent, they should combine multiple information sources to 1 These papers are Sarvary and Parker (1997) , Bakos and Brynjolfsson (2000) and Iyer and Soberman (2000) . Other marketing papers on information pricing include Chu and Messinger (1997) , Bakos and Brynjolfsson (1999) , Raju and Roy (2000) , Sarvary (2002) , Arora and Fosfuri (2005) and Christen (2005) . See also Villas-Boas (1994) and Ofek and Sarvary (2001) . 2 The lack of a positive price-quality relationship has been empirically documented in other product categories and remains largely unexplained (see, for example, Gerstner 1985) .
obtain a more accurate estimate of the underlying truth. This makes competing information products complements, which leads to mild competition between sellers and to higher priceseven higher prices than what a monopolist seller would charge. However, despite the limited incentive to acquire multiple information products of high quality, competition between sellers of high quality information can push the price so low that even in this case buyers consider buying multiple information products. In other words, the equilibrium amount of information purchased may not necessarily differ much between markets with low versus high quality information.
Anecdotal evidence from a number of information product categories seems to be consistent with a negative relationship between information price and quality. For example, in a recent article entitled "Analyzing the Analysts", Business Week reports data from an extensive study concerning information sellers in the highly volatile Information Technology (IT) sector. 3 Wellknown information sellers in this industry include Forrester Research, The Gartner Group, Meta
Group among others who regularly sell industry reports to their clients on market and technology trends. The study consists of a survey with over 300 clients (Information Systems executives)
asking for their assessment of IT analysts' reports on a variety of dimensions. The survey clearly
shows that in the market of hi-tech industry reports, it is more the rule than the exception that clients buy the reports of several different analysts. The article quotes Forrester, for instance, claiming that 90% of its clients are also Gartner's (a competitor's) clients. Furthermore, there seems to be a consensus among executives that the prices of analysts' reports are very high, while all clients perceived the quality of the analysts' reports low in terms of reliability. Similar evidence is provided by Sarvary and Parker (1997) , which suggests virtually no competition among information sellers in the early cellular technology sector. Table 1 shows demand forecasts for cellular phone services by analysts in the mid 1980's. The forecasts reflect very high demand uncertainty in this sector, which is argued to trigger the purchase of multiple forecasts from clients leading to the lack of competition between information sellers.
Insert Table 1 About Here 3 "Analyzing the Analysts", Business Week, 17. November, 1997. While this anecdotal evidence is suggestive, no empirical study has been carried out to systematically test the counterintuitive theoretical predictions about the effect of competition in information markers. In particular, industry data do not allow us to accurately assess market prices as no benchmark is available, since in each industry, we only observe a single quality condition. The purpose of this paper is to fill this gap and test competitive pricing behavior in comparable environments with different (and controlled) levels of information quality and different levels of competition, while preserving most of the complexity of real-world markets in other domains. Importantly, like in the real world, the purchase of information is a means to an end, the end being making (business) decisions.
We use a longitudinal market experiment built around the Markstrat 3 business simulation (Larréché and Gatignon 1998) . 4 The information products to be priced and sold are market size forecasts for different Markstrat markets (segments). Both sellers (participants in a pricing course) and buyers (managers of Markstrat firms in a marketing course) of information want to maximize their own profit over time -sellers by pricing their information products and buyers by deciding from which seller or sellers to buy market forecasts to make marketing mix/production decisions. In other words, both prices and quantities are determined endogenously in the experimental market (like they are in real markets). The longitudinal aspect of the experiment allows us to test whether buyers and sellers are able to learn the implications of the quality level over time causing prices to converge to different levels as a function of the quality of information.
The results strongly support the theoretical predictions. There is evidence of initial price experimentation by information sellers, but over time, prices converge to levels that are strikingly different between the two quality conditions with prices for unreliable information (low quality) being significantly higher than for reliable information (high quality). In other words, the negative relationship between information quality and price is strongly supported.
Furthermore, consistent with the theory, in both quality conditions, buyers tend to purchase multiple information products from different sellers, confirming the subtle interaction between buyers' valuation of information and sellers' strategic pricing.
In additional experiments, we further test the effect of competition on the pricing of unreliable information. When varying the number of competitors, we find that, consistent with the theory, prices for unreliable information products are indeed significantly higher with few competing sellers of information than either with only a single seller (monopoly) or with a large number of competing sellers.
The next section summarizes the background literature related to information acquisition and use. Section 3 elaborates in more detail on the theory of competitive information pricing and outlines our hypotheses. Next, we describe the experiment followed in section 5 by the presentation of the empirical findings. Section 6 present a number of validity tests based on an additional experiment. We discuss the results and their implications and conclude in section 7.
BACKGROUND LITERATURE
There exists a large body of experimental research that has studied individuals' information valuation and acquisition behavior under various conditions (e.g., Rötheli 2001; Schoemaker 1989) . A related line of research concerns the use of sample information to update beliefs (for detailed reviews see Connolly and Serre 1984; Einhorn and Hogarth 1981; Slovic et al. 1977 ).
These studies examine primarily whether the actual acquisition and use of costly information is consistent with normative (Bayesian and expected utility) predictions. Overall, the existing body of evidence suggests that learning is slow and performance poor with both over-and underpurchase occurring depending on the particular situation and context. Most of these experiments confront information users with simple tasks and -importantly -assume that the cost of information is predetermined and fixed. In other words, they do not consider how an information seller would change the price of information as a result of information acquisition and use.
In marketing, there exists an important stream of work on the managerial use of external information. The early studies of the 1970s on management attitudes vis-à-vis market research (e.g. Holbert 1974 , Krum 1978 have been integrated and conceptually developed in a series of studies by Deshpande and Zaltman (1982, 1984) and Moorman et. al. (1993) using survey data.
These studies examine more complex decision environments and highlight a number of important factors influencing the managerial use of market research information, including organizational structure, technical quality, surprise, actionability, and researcher-manager interaction. From our perspective, an important take-away from this research is that the perceived quality of information is systematically assessed by both managers and market researchers as one of the most important factors in the managerial use of information. Patterson (1995) provides further empirical evidence that quality and price are the relevant choice variables for information products. In a survey of 142 client firms, he found that the consultancies' reputation, their experience and their fees are the most important choice criteria for choosing management consultants. In sum, while people may not be able to perfectly estimate the expected value of information, existing empirical research suggests that they are sensitive to quality differences.
By focusing on the acquisition and the usage of information, existing empirical research cannot provide sufficient insight about the effect of the quality of information products on equilibrium information prices under different conditions. Our main research interest does not only lie in the actual purchase behavior of decision makers; it lies in studying how information markets develop when buyers trade-off the cost of information and its value for making decisions, while sellers set prices considering the demand for information and -most importantly -competition.
Specifically, in our study -as in the real world -the cost of information is endogenous in the sense that it is set by competing economic agents and, thus is the result of demand and supply factors. 5 We are interested in the information pricing behavior of these agents but also in how prices change information buyers' behavior predicted by normative decision theory. To attain the objectives of this study, we need a setting with the following characteristics: (1) an information market with information buyers (users) and sellers; (2) a product market where buyers use the acquired information to make decisions; and (3) repeated decisions to enable information buyers and sellers to learn from feedback the quality of information and competitor/customer (pricing/buying) behavior.
Market experiments (with a simultaneous consideration of demand and supply) were conducted in other contexts related to information to examine different questions. For example, in a classic paper, Sunder (1992) uses such an approach in the context of financial information markets testing how a stock trader's private information gets revealed in asset prices as the trader tries to 5 See Villas-Boas and Winer (1999) for a similar argument in the context of brand choice models.
benefit from this information through trade in the stock market. Similar questions are studied in McKelvey and Page (1990) . More generally, this study is also related to experiments in behavioral economics, a fast-growing area of research (Ho et al. 2005 ). To our knowledge, our market experiment to examine the competitive pricing of information is unique.
The next section summarizes the key findings of the theoretical literature concerning the pricing of information products and presents the resulting hypotheses.
THEORY AND HYPOTHESES
We define an information product as information that is (i) used in decision-making and (ii) paid for by the decision maker (see Jensen 1991) . Examples include market forecasts and market research, financial and economic data, some media (e.g. news services), professional advice, or consulting services. 6 An interesting feature of this product category is that consumers can combine multiple products to arrive at a single better product. Combining multiple information sources results in a more accurate view of the world, which generally improves decision-making.
The benefit of combining multiple products depends however, on two fundamental underlying characteristics of the available information goods: their reliability and correlatedness. Clearly, the more correlated the information products are, the less beneficial it is to combine them. Similarly, for a given level of correlation, the more reliable individual information products are, the less beneficial it is to combine them because the marginal impact of an additional piece of information in revealing the truth is much smaller. In the extreme case of perfect information, there is obviously no incentive to combine different information products.
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This possible complementarity of information products creates interesting strategic dynamics between competing firms pricing and selling them. The resulting equilibrium prices reflect counter-intuitive market outcomes, with a number of counter-intuitive practical implications. In 6 Some product categories, often called information products by common language, are excluded by this definition. For example, advertising, not paid for by the decision maker, information technology that is not information per se or most of media, typically used to entertain rather than help making decisions are not information products. 7 Various theoretical studies examine how to optimally combine multiple forecasts (e.g., Winkler 1981) . In this paper we are not interested in how efficient buyers are in combining information from different sources. As long as the above-mentioned basic incentives hold, the theoretical results are valid.
particular, for two competing information sellers and 'non-competing' information buyers 8 Sarvary and Parker (1997) show analytically that, as long as firms are not too different, 9 and their products are not too correlated:
(i) equilibrium prices are negatively related to product quality,
(ii) a monopolist is better off inviting a competitor in the market and (iii) collusion between competitors increases consumer welfare.
The intuition behind these findings is quite intriguing. When information products are of high quality and/or highly correlated, combining multiple products yields little benefit. Buyers can rely on a single source of information leading to a choice between competing products, usually in favor of the cheaper alternative. In this case, information products are substitutes as it is the case for most other product categories. Substitution, in turn, leads to harsh price competition between firms, as each firm is trying to get the sale by lowering its price. In contrast, when buyers perceive the information products to be unreliable and uncorrelated, then a single product has little value, while combining two uncorrelated products leads to information of significantly higher reliability or quality. This makes competing information products complements. Under complementarity, firms anticipate that buyers are actually interested in buying a bundle rather than a single good. Instead of cutting price, firms tend to increase their prices to secure the largest possible share from the total price that a buyer is willing to pay for the bundle. This leads to higher prices. In fact, in this scenario, prices set in competition are higher than the ones that a single monopolist would set centrally. If competing information sellers coordinated their pricing, then not only they would be better off (as is always the case under cooperation) but, since in this case, such coordination means lower prices, even buyers would benefit from it. Finally, the counterintuitive effect of competition disappears as the number of competing sellers becomes sufficiently large. When the number of sellers exceeds the number of information products bought by individual buyers, the market interaction between sellers shifts to competition between high-quality information bundles and prices decline. 8 The key assumption here is that the information sold is not "strategic" in the sense that exclusive ownership of information does not lead to a large and sustainable advantage. 9 When there are large asymmetries between competing information sellers, then usually the better one drives the other(s) out of the market.
It is important to realize the subtle interaction between the fundamental characteristics of information (correlatedness and reliability). Correlation and reliability independently cause information products to be substitutes. For complementarity on the other hand, information products need to be unreliable and uncorrelated. Consequently, we will study the situation when information products are largely independent and the number of sellers is small to focus on the more counter-intuitive effect of reliability or quality.
These outcomes lead to a number of concrete hypotheses about prices and quantities in competitive information markets with different quality levels, which can be tested in a longitudinal market experiment. The experimental setting also allows us to examine the convergence of information prices over time and to compare prices across different competitive settings. The dynamic evolution is interesting because in our experiment we do neither label the quality of forecasts as 'low' or 'high' nor suggest the potential value of combining multiple forecasts. While the theoretical predictions may seem intuitive, it is not clear to what extent a market can learn the subtle interaction between quality and competition -existing research indicates that people perform poorly in information acquisition tasks -or whether the theoretical model of Sarvary and Parker (1997) is a valid representation of information markets.
In our subsequent hypotheses, we assume that the broad conditions of Sarvary and Parker (1997) hold. In this context, our first and central hypothesis concerns the equilibrium prices of information as a function of information quality:
Hypothesis H 1 : With few competitors and independent information products, prices for reliable information are lower than prices for unreliable information, i.e., information quality is negatively related to the market price of information.
The forces that cause information products to be either substitutes or complements are based on normative decision theory. That theory, however, assumes that the buyer incurs a fixed cost for the acquisition of information (i.e., faces a fixed price). Said differently, for the same price buyers buy more unreliable information. To the extent that equilibrium prices are not constant across the two quality conditions, the arguments above are not sufficient to predict the equilibrium purchase amount of information. An interesting outcome of the Sarvary and Parker (1997) model is that in equilibrium buyers may purchase multiple information products regardless of the quality of information. For unreliable information, i.e., under complementarity, this is no surprise. Then, as we argued above, a single forecast is not very valuable for decision making, as it is unreliable. The intuition is more complex when independent information products are reliable. In this case, the decision maker gets most value from one forecast. At very low prices, however, it makes sense for buyers to purchase an additional forecast. While the marginal benefit of this information is low, its price (i.e., its cost to the buyer) is even lower and, therefore, it is worth purchasing it. In the extreme case of free information, a buyer should of course obtain all available information products. Thus, our hypotheses with respect to quantities states:
Hypothesis H 2 : Conditional on buying information, in the low quality condition, buyers purchase at least two information products while in the high quality condition, buyers purchase more than one information product.
This hypothesis, if confirmed, has important implications as it suggests that one cannot necessarily determine the quality "type" of an information market solely by looking at the amount of information purchased per customer (number of reports or expert opinions).
Observing the purchase of multiple information products can indicate either low prices or low quality.
These first two hypotheses concern the core predictions of the theory. The remaining three hypotheses address validity tests. They verify if the observed outcomes are consistent with the concept of equilibrium and are indeed linked to the conditions under which the theory holds. To claim that prices and quantities correspond to an equilibrium, we need to observe convergence of prices over time to stable levels. Both sellers and buyers need to infer the implications of the characteristics of information products for pricing and purchase decisions, respectively. Being unaware of the theoretical predictions, they also need to learn the implications of the properties of "their" information market.
In this paper, we do not make an exact prediction about how the market will learn the implications of information quality on prices. However, the support from our experimental market for hypotheses H 1 and H 2 would be of limited value without convergence to somewhat stable price levels. Learning from market feedback to reach equilibrium is a key issue in behavioral economics (for a review see Ho et al. 2005) . We thus test the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis H 3 : In both quality conditions, the price dispersion in the market place decreases over time and prices converge to fixed levels.
Finally, we are also interested in testing the boundary conditions of the theory by examining the effect of different competitive market structures while keeping the level of information quality low. In other words, we test if we can make our core results vanish by changing the market conditions to which these apply. Specifically, we test the following two hypotheses:
Hypothesis H 4 : With a single seller (monopoly), prices for low quality information products converge to a lower level than when sold by a small number of competing firms.
Hypothesis H 5 :
The positive effect of competition on prices for low quality information products disappears when there is a large number of competing information sellers.
EXPERIMENT Information Buyers: Competing Markstrat Firms
The Markstrat 3 business simulation (Larréché and Gatignon, 1998) constituted the basis for our experiment. The simulation was administered in an MBA marketing core course of a major international business school. Course participants (101 students in total) were organized in 20 teams of roughly equal size (5 students per team) and 4 identical Markstrat industries. 10 Within each industry, five teams representing five firms competed with each other. The overall performance of each firm in the simulation was tightly linked to the group members' final grades in the course (25% of students' grade was based on their team's ranking in terms of stock price and other financial indicators).
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These Markstrat firms constituted the demand-side of our information market. In Markstrat, firms have to purchase market forecasts to set marketing mix variables and production levels.
This context is an ideal setup to simulate a market for information, in which information buyers are the Markstrat teams and information products are the market forecasts. The four industries were divided into the two experimental conditions, i.e., two industries were assigned to the "high-quality" and the other two to the "low-quality" condition. The details of the quality manipulation are explained below. Each experimental condition, therefore, contained ten information-buying Markstrat firms.
The model in Sarvary and Parker (1997) assumes independent information buyers while
Markstrat firms compete with each other. However, for the theory to hold, the important assumption is that the information purchased does not represent a strategic advantage for the buyers. As we explain below, this is the case for our experiment where information products consisted of short-term market forecasts. These were only used by firms for operational decisions (e.g., setting production levels). Furthermore, research shows that competition between information buyers reduces the effect of complementarity on information prices (Xiang and Sarvary 2005) . In other words, using Markstrat makes the tests of the theory more conservative because the price difference between low and high quality information should decrease with competition between information buyers.
Competing Information Sellers
A different set of MBA students (33 in total), who participated in an elective course on pricing strategies at the same school, were assigned the task of pricing the information products. A particularly attractive feature of the sample was that they were all familiar with the Markstrat world, because they all had taken the same core course using the Markstrat simulation six months earlier. They were organized in ten groups (called research firms R1, R2, … R10).
Similar to buyer teams, seller teams' grades were also based on their relative performance (profit) in selling information (25% of their grade). The top 2 performers in terms of revenues were also promised a bottle of champagne each. Each seller team was randomly assigned to one of the two quality conditions. This quality level applied to all information products sold by a particular seller and did not change over time. Neither sellers nor buyers were aware of the quality manipulation.
There were five seller teams in each quality condition. Each seller team competed with 1 or 2 other seller teams with identical product characteristics, but in each period it competed with different seller teams from the same quality condition. As two Markstrat industries were assigned to each quality condition, seller teams would occasionally shift between industries, in this way facing different customers. While the sellers changed over time in a given Markstrat industry, a particular buyer always had access to the same number of competing sellers (2 in one industry and 3 in the other industry). This change in competitive set was used to try to limit the ability of sellers adopting cooperative pricing strategies. Similarly, it prevented sellers from negotiating long-term agreements with buyers. Sellers did not know their next set of competitors and buyers.
Similarly, buyers did not know their next set of sellers.
The experimental design has 8 cells -2 quality conditions X 2 product categories 
Information Products
In Markstrat, firms compete in two product categories: one of these (Sonites) is an existing, relatively mature category, in which all competing Markstrat firms participate (at least initially); the other category (Vodites) is a new or emerging product category, where firms have the option to enter. The Sonite category consists of five segments; the Vodite category has three segments.
Each segment grows at a different rate. We grouped the eight one-period market size forecasts corresponding to each of these segments into three different information products or bundles of forecasts. A first bundle consisted of two forecasts for the fastest growing Sonite segments and a second bundle contained the forecasts for the three Vodite segments. These two information products (bundles) were priced and sold by each of the information sellers. While the forecasts by information sellers within the same quality condition had the same statistical properties (e.g., variance), the actual forecasts provided different figures. The forecasts for the remaining three Sonite segments, which were more mature and thus experienced smaller changes in market size, were available from an "outside" firm. The price of this third bundle was set by the experimenter and was the same across all conditions. Initially this price was $15K, but it increased over time with the inflation of the Markstrat world. By the end of the experiment, it had increased to $25K.
This separation of the various market forecasts was selected for three reasons. First, having sellers price two information products, allows us to increase the number of observations (within seller replication). Pricing each market forecast individually, on the other hand, would have made the pricing task much more complicated and therefore increased the noise in the data.
Second, the two high-growth Sonite segments and the three Vodite segments experienced rapid changes, which created considerable incentives to purchase information every period. In contrast, the remaining three Sonite segments experienced less change, which limited the need to buy forecasts every period. Finally, setting the price of the forecasts ourselves for the three lowgrowth Sonite segments provided an initial anchor or reference price that was common for all information sellers and buyers regardless of the experimental condition.
Each information product consisted of one-period forecasts only. As such, the information was primarily valuable for operational decisions (e.g. setting of production quantities), rather than to make strategic decisions (e.g. whether or not to enter a new market). To guide strategy, Markstrat teams were given, for free, a qualitative assessment of the expected long-term growth for each market segment. The forecasts available within the Markstrat software were disabled.
Experimental Conditions
As indicated earlier, the four Markstrat industries were assigned to two different information quality conditions. Neither buyers nor sellers were directly informed whether their information was of high or low quality. Instead, they were provided with a series of numbers for each information selling firm. They were told that these numbers represented historical demand forecasts made by the firms for another market. To be able to evaluate the accuracy of these historical forecasts, they were also given the actual outcomes. These historical forecasts are shown in Table 2 . This 'quality' information was provided to both sellers and buyers for every decision period with the Information Pricing Form and the Information Ordering Form (see Appendices A and B, respectively). As such, this "quality" information was common knowledge.
However, both buyers and sellers had to learn the value of forecasts and the implication of the quality level for information prices.
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Insert Table 2 About Here These historical data were created to be consistent with the variance parameters used to generate the actual forecasts but had different means. A number of pretests were carried out to check these manipulations. A pre-test using MBA students from another section who were also enrolled in the same Markstrat course but did not participate in the experiment was conducted to ensure that the quality of these forecasts was perceived to be equal across the five different information sellers within a quality condition. Based on the pretest, we adjusted the historical data to balance not only the average forecasting error but also to ensure that the best and worst forecasts were somewhat equally distributed across research firms. To achieve this balance, it became difficult to also accurately 'signal' the independence between the forecasts. As a result, for the highquality condition, the empirical correlation of forecasts was 0.37 and 0.19 for the low-quality condition. A second pretest, however, confirmed that subjects perceived these forecasts "independent". In the low quality condition several students have actually used the term "uncorrelated". For the high quality condition the forecasts were perceived to be "similar", "redundant" or "the same" independent of correlation.
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Actual forecasts were generated by drawing random numbers from a multivariate normal distribution. The variances of the distribution differed between the two quality conditions. For the high-quality condition, we set the standard deviation to 5% of the mean and for the lowquality condition to 18% of the mean. These standard deviations are consistent with what industry participants would observe in the real world in an uncertain market (see Table 1 before).
The means of the distribution corresponded to the demand forecasts generated by Markstrat. 14 In 12 For the information buying (Markstrat) teams, the different conditions coincided with different sections of the marketing core course. They were thus largely unaware of the manipulation. By the end of the simulation, some information selling teams knew that there were differences but did not know the nature of the manipulation. 13 Specifically, this second pretest showed subjects different sets of low and high quality forecasts with low (negative and positive) correlation as well as with no correlation. No difference was recorded in terms of perceived correlations across sets. This is not surprising given that correlation is the second moment that is not easy to infer from 5 data points. Debriefs after the experiment also confirmed that subjects were concerned about "best" and "worst" forecasts rather than correlation across forecasts. 14 True demand for a given Markstrat segment depends on the decisions made by the information buying firms and is thus not known when making the forecasts.
other words, each forecast for a segment was (usually) a different number, but the statistical properties of the forecasts were identical across information sellers within the same experimental condition. Only the means changed over time based on the evolution of the market segments in the different Markstrat industries.
Given the above design, the sample statistics (variance and correlation) of the historical forecasts provided to all subjects (see Table 2 ) and those of the forecasts generated every period in the context of the Markstrat simulation were slightly different. This small difference was not perceived by subjects, however. In the post-experiment debriefs, no teams have raised any issue about inconsistencies across these data.
15
Procedure: Market Transactions
In each period, the sellers of information were asked to price the two bundles of forecasts -two Sonite forecasts and three Vodite forecasts -knowing which Markstrat firms were the potential buyers and knowing which other seller(s) they were competing against (see the sample Information Pricing Form in Appendix A). In addition, they were always given the price of the third bundle of forecasts for the remaining three segments in the Sonite category. (Initially, this price was $15K and subsequently increased with inflation). Finally, they also received the previous period's prices and unit sales for all five information sellers competing in the same quality condition.
Seeing the different price offers and having access to the information products' reliabilities as indicated by the historical forecasts, buyers could purchase information from any (none, one or multiple) seller. Appendix B provides a sample of the "Information Order Form", which was submitted with a Markstrat decision to the administrator. Markstrat teams received the purchased market forecasts with all the Markstrat results and data (see Appendix C for a sample). In total, there were seven pricing periods and Markstrat decisions.
After the experiment, all subjects were debriefed in groups (buyers and sellers). The debriefing
consisted of an open question to provide a rationale for the group's information acquisition/sales 15 It is important to note that neither sellers nor buyers ever saw a complete set of forecasts from all research firms. First, sellers rarely asked for and hardly ever saw the forecasts. Second, buyers did not have access to the same research firm every period. Third, they only saw the purchased forecasts. Thus, the historical data represented the only consistently available quality indication for the information for both sellers and buyers.
strategy. After the debriefings, all participants were explained the experiments and were shown the preliminary results.
RESULTS
The longitudinal market experiment yielded 255 transactions to test our hypotheses. We eliminated the last period (period 7), because the purchase decisions were likely affected by "end-gaming" of buying teams. The dependent variable of interest is the transaction price. In other words, a price for an information product that was not sold is not included. Average transaction prices in the different quality conditions are illustrated in Figure 2 for the Sonite and The graphs in Figure 2 clearly suggest that the results are in the direction predicted by our first hypothesis. The average prices paid are considerably higher in the low-quality condition than in the high-quality condition. This is true for information products concerning both Sonite and Vodite product categories. Furthermore, average prices change little after about decision 3, which is consistent with markets reaching an equilibrium state. Figure 3 , which shows the prices set by the different information sellers, further supports this. It indicates that, after significant variance between firms during early periods, prices converge to highly consistent levels across Markstrat industries in the same experimental conditions. We next report the results from formal statistical analyses to test our hypotheses. Table 3a ). Table 3b shows the same results but only for the last three decision periods to eliminate the effect of pricing and buying experimentation that took place in the market during the first few periods. The results show higher mean prices and substantially lower standard deviations. Across all conditions, the average price is 136.5 for low quality information and 38.9 for high quality information. The t-value of the mean difference is 32.6 (p<0.001) -see last column of Table 3b .
Insert Figure 3 About Here

Information Prices
Insert Table 3 About Here
To rule out that the above result is an artifact of pooling data across decisions periods, we next conduct a period-by-period comparison of the mean prices. This analysis is possible because we can pool the data across product categories and Markstrat industries. F-tests did generally not reject the pooling of data (in particular not after the first two periods). Table 4 shows the results from this analysis. We find statistically significant differences in the direction predicted by hypothesis H 1 for all periods. Except for the first period, this holds also true when doing the comparisons separately for Sonites and Vodites or separately for the Markstrat industries (2 sellers versus 3 sellers). Again, the results in Table 4 show the convergence of prices over time.
After decision 3, the changes in average prices are only marginally significant and the standard deviations are much lower, remain quite stable and are the same in both quality conditions.
Insert Table 4 About Here Even though the parameter settings were the same for all four Markstrat industries, these industries evolve somewhat differently over time because industry evolution also depends on the decisions by the competing firms (information buyers). To examine, whether such differences could account for the above results, we next use a regression analysis with a number of covariates capturing the product market conditions faced by the information buyers. In addition,
we control for fixed effects related to information sellers. The results from this analysis are shown in Table 5 . Model 1 is a simple 'main effects' model and shows that there are no significant differences between product categories or between Markstrat industries. Model 2, however, shows a significant interaction effect for quality and category. As can be seen in Figure   2 , average Vodite prices in the low-quality condition were slightly lower than average Sonite prices, while the reverse was true for the high-quality condition. In Model 2, the parameter estimate of quality indicates the effect of quality for Sonites and not the average or main effect.
This explains the much lower parameter estimate in Model 2 versus Model 1 (-93.1 vs. -76.3).
Model 3 accounts for period-specific effects and shows that the simpler Model 1 sufficiently captures changes over time.
Insert Table 5 About Here
Model 4 is of most interest because it shows that the negative effect of information quality on prices holds even when controlling for differences between Markstrat industries and information sellers. The parameter estimate for quality is somewhat smaller (in absolute terms) when we include the covariates and control for seller fixed-effects (-65.7 versus -76.3 ). However, the negative effect of quality remains highly significant. The effects of different Markstrat industry characteristics are insignificant. Specifically, Model 4 shows 3 covariates -the growth of the Sonite market, the extent to which the leading Markstrat firm dominated its industry (ratio of its profit to total industry profit), and total industry profit. We lagged these variables to capture the conditions that prevailed at the time buyers made their information purchase decisions. None of the effects reach statistical significance. (We repeated this analysis with a number of other covariates and found the same results.)
Purchase Quantities
To formally test hypothesis H 2 , we again conduct a series of statistical tests. This hypothesis says that in the low quality condition buyers purchase at least two information products (if at all), while in the high quality condition they purchase more than one information product. To test this hypothesis, we first calculate for each quality condition the mean purchases per firm conditional on a firm purchasing at least one report. This is necessary because the high price of information in the low quality condition may stop some firms from buying any information.
The results are provided in Table 6 . These results show that indeed the average purchase amount is higher than 1 for both quality conditions. In the low quality condition, the average number of reports purchased per period and firm is 1.98 reports, which is significantly higher than 1 (t = 20.2; p<0.001). According to hypothesis H 2 , firms who buy a report should buy at least 2 reports.
The mean is just below 2, but the difference is not statistically significant (t = 0.474; p=0.64).
The average number of reports differs very little between the two information products. Firms purchased on average 1.96 Sonite reports and 2.00 Vodite reports. Over time, the average number of reports varies from a low of 1.625 Sonite reports in period 2 to a high of 2.25 Vodite reports in period 6. The average is at least 2 in 9 of the 12 observations (6 periods times 2 information products).
Insert Table 6 About Here
In the high quality condition, the average number of reports purchased per period and firm is 1.67 reports, which is significantly higher than 1 (t = 7.60; p<0.001). The average number of Sonite reports purchased (1.55) is slightly lower than the average number of Vodite reports (1.77), but both numbers are significantly higher than 1. The average purchase ranges from a low of only 1.25 Sonite reports per firm in period 3 (when some research firms set very high prices) to 2.25 Vodite reports per firm in period 4. The average is 2 or more reports in only 2 of the 12 observations. The average number of reports purchased in the high quality condition is significantly lower than in the low quality condition (t = 3.14; p=0.005).
Together these results provide strong support for both parts of hypothesis H 2 , including the less intuitive part that even in the high quality condition firms would purchase more than 1 report. This is important because it supports the argument that one cannot infer the quality "type" of an information market by simply looking at average purchase quantities.
VALIDITY TESTS Price Dynamics
With respect to the dynamics of pricing, Figure 3 shows the evolution of prices over time for each product market in the two conditions. Each panel in Figure 3 shows each firm's prices over time across product categories and conditions. (Figure 2 shows the average prices paid in the market place.) The first thing to notice is that price dispersion clearly decreases over time. The variance of prices in the first three periods is significantly higher than the variance of prices in the last three periods. This is formally confirmed by a test on variances. All four F-test statistics (2 conditions × 2 product markets) are highly significant (i.e., p<0.001). A period-by-period comparison of the prices charged by the information sellers indicates that the reduction in variances from period 2 to period 3 and from period 3 to period 4 were particularly significant (see Table 4 ). As discussed earlier in the regression analysis, average prices also increased rapidly until period 3 and then fluctuated relatively little around somewhat lower price levels than were reached in period 3. As such, hypothesis H 3 is strongly supported, suggesting that the market has indeed converged to an equilibrium.
Effect of Competition for Low Quality Information
The results presented so far strongly support the main proposition of the theory that with few competing information sellers and independent information products prices for low quality information exceed those for high quality information. This theoretical prediction is based on the possibility of combining multiple pieces of information from different vendors into a single, more accurate piece of information, which can make information from competing firms complementary products. This has two implications for information prices under different competitive market structures. First, no complementarity can exist when there is only a single vendor (monopoly). Second, the complementarity disappears as the number of firms becomes large because the marginal improvement in the quality of information gained from the last firm decreases as the number of competitors increases. These two implications are the basis for hypotheses H 4 and H 5 .
To test these two hypotheses, we repeated the experimental market described in section 4 except that we kept the quality of information low and constant across all information sellers and instead varied the number of information sellers. Specifically, we used two Markstrat industries.
In one Markstrat industry, information buyers had access to only one information seller (monopoly), while in the second Markstrat industry information buyers had access to five information sellers (strong competition). To be able to compare the results to the previous experiment, we kept everything else the same, including the setup of the Markstrat industries and the quality manipulation. (In the case with only one information seller, the historical data only showed the series for one firm.) The subjects were participants in the same two MBA courses but from new promotions. (All participants in the previous experiment had graduated.) Table 7 shows the average transaction prices for the three competitive levels and both product categories - Table 7a for all periods and Table 7b only for the last three periods. The mean prices are all consistent with hypotheses H 4 and H 5 . Prices are higher in the condition with limited competition than in the other two conditions. All t-tests comparing the mean prices of limited competition to those in the monopoly condition are highly statistically significant, supporting hypothesis H 4 . Similarly, all t-test comparing the mean prices of limited competition to those in the strong competition condition are highly statistically significant, supporting hypothesis H 5 .
We also compared the monopoly prices with the strong competition prices and found the former to be significantly higher. While we have no theoretical interest in this comparison, the result is as one would expect, thereby lending credence to the validity of our experimental market.
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We also conduct a regression analysis using fixed-effects estimation to control for firm (information seller) specific factors, which are ignored in the simple mean comparison tests presented in Table 7 . The regression results are presented in Table 8 . The corresponding specification tests confirm the findings from Table 7 . The average prices across the three conditions are different (F(2, 272) = 44.8, p<0.001). Moreover, the average prices for limited competition are higher than the average prices in the monopoly condition (F(1, 272) = 67.9, p<0.001) and in the strong competition condition (F(1, 272) = 71.3, p<0.001). The average prices in the monopoly condition are marginally higher than in the strong competition condition (F(1, 272) = 3.60, p=0.059). These comparisons are based on data from all periods. Again, when we use only the data from the last three periods, the differences become more pronounced and the statistical significance higher.
Insert Table 8 About Here
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
The goal of this paper was to test the theoretical model of competitive information pricing proposed by Sarvary and Parker (1997) . A central hypothesis advanced by this model is that the reliability or quality of independent information products do not map continuously in the equilibrium prices set by competing firms selling these products -as is generally the case for other product categories. Instead, changes in the reliability of information may lead to qualitatively different competitive patterns. Specifically, when information products are of high quality, they tend to be substitutes and equilibrium prices are low. In contrast, when independent information products are of low quality, they are complements resulting in high prices. In other words, there is a negative relationship between the quality (accuracy) of information and its market price. The results of our experiments have strongly supported the predictions of the model. Prices across different quality conditions and different competitive conditions were significantly different and as predicted by the theory. They were also surprisingly consistent across independent markets (Markstrat industries) within the same condition.
A key aspect of our experiment was the fact that we did not directly communicate the characteristics of information to market participants. 16 Instead, we allowed buyers and sellers to infer them from historical data. The finding that prices initially did not differ much between conditions but then diverged over time to finally stabilize at a relatively constant level indicates that the market was able to "learn" the implications of quality differences. Other elements of our experimental market could have worked against us. For example, the price of the third set of forecasts provided the same anchor for both quality conditions. In addition, buying multiple forecasts was at odds with the Markstrat simulation where all other market research was only available from a single seller. In fact, the experiment shows that both buyers and sellers made remarkably good qualitative assessment about the characteristics of information products and their value. This finding is interesting when contrasted with previous experiments on the demand side of information markets (see, e.g., Einhorn and Hogarth 1981) . While existing studies show that people are not very good 'statisticians' when it comes to 'optimal' acquisition of information or the 'correct' combination of multiple information sources, our study suggests that they are quite good 'strategists' in the sense that they can qualitatively assess the market value of information and trade it off against its cost. Specifically, people seem to perceive the 'redundancy' of information products when these are of high quality and, conversely, they see their complementarity when information is of low quality. However, their reaction to these information characteristics is not independent of the price of information.
On the demand side, our results relating to purchase quantities are also interesting. Here, the basic finding is that in both experimental conditions buyers tend to purchase more than one information product. By naïve interpretation, this consumer behavior contradicts normative decision theory since it appears as if subjects combined information products ignoring the benefits associated with doing so. This interpretation however, is misleading and shows the importance of carefully considering the fact that prices and quantities are simultaneously established in equilibrium. Most experiments in marketing include only one 'type' of decision maker in a market, either customers or sellers, implicitly fixing one of these two variables. Using an experiment where both buyers and sellers interact repeatedly over time allowed us to support the theoretical prediction regarding purchase quantities. In the high-quality condition, consumers' unwillingness to combine multiple products pushed prices lower as it triggered intense competition between information sellers. At low equilibrium prices, buyers ended-up buying from multiple sellers. In contrast, in the low-quality condition, it pays for consumers to purchase from more than one source. Here, competition forces firms to price higher to extract the maximum surplus from consumers forcing consumers to decide between not buying at all and buying multiple products. While in the experiment several buyers did buy only one report, it is interesting to note that in the low-quality condition a much larger number of buyers decided not to buy any information at all. Thus, buyers in the low-quality conditions were much more likely to consider the purchase of either no or multiple information products. These results show the subtle interaction between competitive pricing and consumer behavior in information markets.
The results from our second experiment further substantiate the theoretical predictions by Sarvary and Parker (1997) . The first result confirms the counterintuitive prediction that having (some) competition can be more profitable than being a monopolist. The second result is important because it shows that there is a limit to the complementarity effect of competition on information prices. In particular, it shows that the subjects were able to understand the value of acquiring information from multiple sources and did not use simple decision heuristics such as "either buy nothing or everything". Finally, showing that monopoly prices are higher than prices under strong competition provides further validity to the experimental market.
17
Our study has a few limitations. First, our experimental information market is based on Markstrat, where the environment itself develops endogenously over time based on the decisions of competing firms (information buyers in our experiment). Hence, we do not have full control over the experimental market and differences between prices could be confounded with differences between industries. This is a price that one has to pay for using a more complex decision environment. We tried to address this problem by showing that including various covariates in the analysis to capture differences between Markstrat industries did not change the results. 18 To further address this important concern, we also replicated the entire first experiment using a different Markstrat scenario (i.e., different parameter setting to influence industry evolution), using different subjects, and having always three competing information sellers (for a conservative test). The average prices in the low-quality condition were somewhat lower than obtained in the first experiment, but the differences in prices between the high and low quality conditions were again statistically significant. Moreover, the average price in the low quality condition was still higher than the price in the monopoly condition. In sum, the replication yielded results that were fully consistent with the results presented in this paper.
We have also assumed that the existence of strategic interactions between information buyers does not have a significant effect on the value of information. First, we are confident that one-period forecasts do not represent a large strategic advantage for Markstrat firms. The debriefing also provide evidence that these forecasts were used for operational decisions (e.g., setting production quantities) rather than strategic decisions (e.g. whether to enter/not enter a new market). 19 For this, teams use the qualitative growth forecast for the different segments. Also, while Iyer and Soberman (2000) show that sellers may take into account in their selling strategies if information provides a large strategic advantage to buyers, these selling strategies can only be implemented if buyers are allowed to sign exclusive contracts with sellers. We did not allow this to happen. Our research design made it all but impossible to do so. Also, it was not possible for information vendors to sell information "under the table" because they never had forecasts before the Markstrat decision was over. Finally and most importantly, recent research
shows (see Xiang and Sarvary 2005 ) that strategic interactions between buyers reduce complementarity between low-quality information products indicating that our market experiment is a conservative test of the theory. While we cannot entirely rule out the effect of these competitive externalities, it is highly unlikely that they are responsible for our empirical findings.
19 Differences in prices across the two conditions also suggest that buyers purchased information more for their own decision making as opposed to protect themselves from strategic disadvantage (in the latter case prices should have been higher in the high-quality condition). Sonite Vodite * The subsets S(2) and S(3) of information sellers assigned to a Markstrat industry (information buyers) change from period to period. Industries H 1 and L 1 are always served by 2 information sellers, industries H 2 and L 2 are always served by 3 information sellers. Sonite and Vodite denote the two product markets in Markstrat that the information products refer to. Firm 10 * Some of these prices charged did not result in actual purchases, i.e. did not become transaction prices. 
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